Project · agent runtime
jsaiOS
Status: in development · Python · source private for now
jsaiOS is an AI-native operating layer for Linux. The assistant manages tasks, files and workflows through a set of defined tools instead of acting as a free-roaming agent with shell access.
Why controlled tools
Giving a model an unrestricted shell is the fastest demo and the worst threat model. jsaiOS applies least privilege from day one: every action the model can take is explicit and scoped, so the attack surface stays small and a bad answer stays contained.
Coming from dog training, the idea is familiar: you don't hand over full freedom until you've built structure, boundaries and trust, one step at a time.
The risk policy
Every tool request goes through one gate, ToolRegistry.execute(), which applies the authorization policy.
| Tool risk | Decision |
|---|---|
read_only | Runs. |
user_change, system_change | A human is asked at the terminal. Anything but y means no. |
high_risk | Never offered to the model and never run, even if approved. |
The model is untrusted input
- Arguments must match the tool's declared schema. Unknown keys, missing keys and wrong types are rejected before anyone is asked to approve.
- Bad JSON, unknown tools, denied tools and tool errors go back to the model as short error results. They never crash the runtime or leak a stack trace.
- Tool output returned to the model is size-capped, and the agent stops after five model calls.
- File tools are confined to their own folder. Names are allow-listed, so
../../.bashrcis rejected, and symlinks are refused.
Audit trail
Every tool request is appended to a JSON Lines audit log with a UTC timestamp: tool, risk, decision, argument names and outcome. Argument values are never logged. The log is mode 600 in a mode 700 folder, a symlink at its path is refused, and tools won't run at all if the log can't be opened.
Talking to local models
jsaiOS speaks the OpenAI-compatible API used by local servers such as llama.cpp. The client is hardened on purpose:
- Only loopback and private network addresses are accepted, so a typo can't send prompts or keys to the internet.
- API keys come from the environment, never the repo, and never appear in logs, errors or
repr(). - HTTP redirects are refused, because following one would resend the key to another host.
- Every request has a timeout and every response is size-capped.
What's next
- More tools, each with a written risk rating and tests for the abuse cases.
- Red-teaming jsaiOS with the techniques from my Security+ study: prompt injection through tool output, path tricks and approval fatigue.
- Writeups of each finding and fix.